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| Alone on the Union Left: Colonel David Stuart's Stubborn Defense |
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| Written by Dan Graff | |
| Saturday, 11 April 2009 | |
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This is Dan's second hike report, though I believe it was written first, hence the first line.
This was the third hike of the first day and my second.. I will write about the earlier hike later.. At the time of the attack on his camps Stuart as probably everyone else on the battlefield at that time realized something was amiss and the long roll was sounded. Initially, the troops formed in front of the camps which were facing south. This placed the initial battle line well south of the Hamburg Rd. As the confederates approached the regiment fell back to the Hamburg Road and made their initial stand there... The attacking force consisted of five confederate regiments and Gage's Alabama Battery. Stuart had three small regiments and no artillery support.. During the American Civil War it was found that if a Brigade Commander had commanded a regiment of that brigade before taking brigade command position when the fighting got heavy they would often go to their initial regiment and fight from there.. Apparently Mr Stuart was no exception to this tendency. When the fighting started Stuart went to the 55th Illinois (who he organized) and along with the 54th Ohio began moving toward the northeast. In the process these two units and Stuart became separated from the 71st Ohio. At this point I think the hike could have been renamed "Where is the 71st Ohio? It appears that at this juncture the 71st Ohio for all intents and purposes disappeared. It did not reappear until late in the evening at the landing. Since nobody saw them or could account for their actions during the day rumors began to fly almost immediately that they had ran and hid. After the battle the rumors became more persistent. Things became more complicated when the commanders of the 54th Ohio and 55th Illinois did not write an after action report which could have documented the whereabouts of the 71st. . Colonel Stuart did write an AAR. However, he was wounded before 1PM. Naturally, his report was incomplete after this point. However, he made the statement in his report that that when the fighting started he lost contact with the 71st and "I did not see them for the rest of the day". Certainly a damaging statement made about a regiment accused of running. Finally, on the morning on April 6th sick call was taken. About 300 men reported for sick call. As was standard procedure the 300 men was sent to the landing. They hit the road about the time the attack started and was in the mass of men from Prentiss camps and other parts of the battlefield heading toward the landing. Naturally, these men from the 71st were seen and remembered. Nobody remembered the 500 men remaining in camp and participating in the fighting. Another nail in the coffin of the 71st. After the battle the rumors grew and eventually Colonel Mason who commanded the 71st and 12 officers were cashiered out of the army. They were never court martialed or formally charged but simply removed from the army. The accused men protested loudly and demanded their day in court. Finally, Ohio politicians got involved and congressional hearings were held. At this time our rather chilly group moved north about 150 yards through a rather deep ravine and on another ridge. A perfect defensive position. Also, for the modern day battlefield trampers it was shielded from the wind and not quite as cold. As one can imagine, the congressional hearings resulted in the taking of depositions from former members of the 71st. Because the depositions took place many months after the battle none of the witnesses were still members of the regiment. They were scattered across the country and some were no longer in the army. In other words, for the most part they no longer had a dog in the hunt. Throughout the questioning the men seemed to describe a common action and agreed on many key point of this action.. For example, after the 71st lost contact with it's sister regiments all agreed that the 71st moved back to a defensive position from 100 to 300 yards behind the initial line.. All agreed that Colonel Mason had a conversation with Colonel McArthur on that line.. There were also other key points that I did not jot down.. Recent studies of the Shiloh Battlefield that have been conducted revealed that something or somebody in addition to the 54th Ohio and 55th Illinois was holding up the 4400 man Confederate attack.. This hold up or delay seemed to originate on the ridge where we were standing.. The only unit whose actions could not be accounted for during the battle was the 71st Ohio.. Finally, the 71st suffered a casualty rate of about 20%. Awful high for a unit that ran.. Though no final conclusion was drawn at the end of the hike I was left with the impression that the 71st Ohio could had been falsely accused of running and instead made a brave stand on that very ridge where we were standing.. In the process, helping to delay the confederate advance and provide the time for the last line to form |
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