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| Battle of the Ravines: General Chalmers Confederate Assault |
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| Written by Dan Graff | |
| Saturday, 11 April 2009 | |
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The following is Dan Graf's report on a battlefield hike he took the week after the 2009 Shiloh Anniversary Living History. There were a number if hikes, and this is the first in a series of reports on those hikes. The content was taken from the Shiloh Discussion Group with Dan's permission. There is a link to the group in our Links section, but you can also click here to check it out. If you are interested in learning about the battle and battlefield, this is an excellent resource.
We met Dr Gentsch in Fraley Field at 0800 sharp. As we have learned to
expect from his other hikes we immediately jumped into the subject at
hand. Specifically, Gladden and Chalmers attack on the Union left and
how terrain affected the outcome. Also, though the confederates knew approximately the number of Union troops present at Shiloh they did not know where they were, the depths of the camps or as we learned in another hike the direction the camps were facing. The attacking forces attempted to overcome this lack of intelligence by employing a battle line almost three miles long. Enough to cover the bases with a little overlap. From our initial position in Spain Field Dr Gentsch described the attack. A confederate Division approached Millers Brigade from the south. Miller responded by initially deploying his troops in the fence line at the south side of the field. Here the Union repulsed the first confederate attack.. Shortly after this attack was repulsed the Union forces moved to the North end of Spain Field. Moving these troops resulted into turning Spain Field into a "kill zone". A large open area across which attacking troops had to pass under heavy fire. The result was heavy casualties for the attacking confederates. A pair of charges plus increasing pressure from troops attacking Prentiss from the north was necessary to finally dislodge the Union and cause a retreat toward the landing.. The attacking Confederates paid a heavy price. They suffered heavy casualties in Spain Field. Also, their commander, Colonel Gladden, had been mortally wounded in the assault.. At this point our trusty group of trampers hoofed out of Spain Field to Marker 393. This was the position of Chalmers and Jackson at the end of the assault. As the attack ended they thought they had basically won the fight. They thought they had hit the Union left and moved those troops away from the river. Their elation was short lived with the discovery of Colonel David Stuarts Brigade camped in Larking Bell Field. These troops were assigned to guard the Lick Creek Fjord. The problem was these troops were west of where Chalmers and Jackson were deployed. This meant the Union left had not been turned away from the river. This situation had to be rectified.. Initial reports seriously inflated the number of U.S. troops in Larking Bell Field. Stuart had one understrength brigade of about 2100 men in the field. To meet this threat the confederates deployed two brigades to attack Stuart. When redeploying Chalmers and Jackson to attack the decision was made to send the confederates via the Eastern Cornith Road to the Historic Bark Road. Then up the Hamburg Road to attack Stuart.. A process that would take almost two hours. Two hours the confederates did not have to spare. Though an overland route would have been shorter the decision was made to send the troops by road because of the rugged terrain. To prove the point Dr Gentsch took our little band overland toward the Larkin Bell Field and the Union left. Needless to say the going was rough and the group became badly scattered. In fact, several folks dropped out and returned to their vehicles. We emerged from the woods on the Hamburg Purdy road on the south side of the Sara Bell Cotton Field. Dr Gentsch explained that Hulbert's troops hand initially deployed on the south and west side of the field, However, they quickly redeployed to the north side of the field. This again set up a "kill zone" similar to the one in Spain Field albeit much larger. Dr Gentsch also pointed out the location of Willards Battery and how they employed a reverse slope" position to protect themselves from the attacking confederates.. From our position at the Sara Bell Field we moved to the Johnson Mortuary Monument. In the ravine where Johnson died Dr Gentsch explained that at the time of his death Albert Sidney Johnson was no longer in effective command of the confederate army. Johnson was too far to the right and too far forward. For all intents and purposes Beauregard from his position at Shiloh Church was commanding the Confederates. From the death site we moved over a couple of ravines. Here Dr Gentsch demonstrated how Stuart's men used terrain and "indian fighting" techniques to again delay the five attacking confederate regiments. Another delay the confederates could not afford. Our last stop of the day was at Marker 383. After the brutal attack across Spain Field Gladdens men arrived at this location about 9am. Here they went into a defensive formation and remained there until 3PM. The fact that they were static at this point for six hours while the battle raged around them indicates how badly they were hurt. They needed time to consolidate, regroup and lick their wounds. At this point, Dr Gentsch summarized points we heard throughout the hikes. Time is a key element in warfare. At Shiloh time was crucial. Items such as poor planning, poor intelligence and terrain caused the confederates to lose precious time.. time that ultimately cost them the battle |
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